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THE BOUNDED PROPER FORCING AXIOM AND WELL
ORDERINGS OF THE REALS
Andre´s Eduardo Caicedo and Boban Velicˇkovic´
Abstract. We show that the bounded proper forcing axiom BPFA implies that there
is a well-ordering of P(ω1) which is Δ1 deﬁnable with parameter a subset of ω1. Our
proof shows that if BPFA holds then any inner model of the universe of sets that cor-
rectly computes ℵ2 and also satisﬁes BPFA must contain all subsets of ω1. We show
as applications how to build minimal models of BPFA and that BPFA implies that the
decision problem for the Ha¨rtig quantiﬁer is not lightface projective.
1. Introduction
Forcing axioms are natural combinatorial statements which decide many of the
questions left open by the usual axioms ZFC of set theory. The study of these axioms
was started by Martin and Solovay [13] who introduced Martin’s axiom MA as an
abstraction of Solovay and Tennenbaum’s approach to solving Suslin’s problem [17],
a question about uncountable trees. It was soon realized that MA together with the
negation of the continuum hypothesis CH provides a rich structure theory for the
reals. MA states a form of saturation of the universe of sets under possible sets added
by forcing notions that satisfy the countable chain condition. As the method of forc-
ing was further developed, generalizations of MA to larger classes of forcing posets
were considered as well, most notably the proper forcing axiom PFA introduced by
Baumgartner and Shelah (see, for example, Baumgartner’s survey paper [3]) and Mar-
tin’s maximum MM, the provably strongest forcing axiom, introduced by Foreman,
Magidor and Shelah [7].
In recent years, bounded versions of traditional forcing axioms have received a
considerable amount of attention as they have many of the same consequences, yet
require much smaller large cardinal assumptions. These statements were ﬁrst con-
sidered by Goldstern and Shelah in [8] who showed that the bounded proper forcing
axiom BPFA is equiconsistent with a relatively modest large cardinal axiom, the exis-
tence of a Σ1-reﬂecting cardinal. An appealing formulation of bounded forcing axioms
as principles of generic absoluteness was provided by Bagaria [1]. Namely, suppose
K is a class of forcing notions. The bounded forcing axiom BFA(K) is the statement
asserting that for every P ∈ K,
(Hℵ2 ,∈) ≺Σ1 (V
P ,∈).
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Here Hℵ2 denotes the collection of all sets whose transitive closure has size at most
ℵ1. Thus, BFA(K) states that for every Σ0 formula ψ(x, a) with parameter a ∈ Hℵ2 , if
some forcing notion from K introduces a witness x for ψ(x, a), then such an x already
exists. For example, MAℵ1 is BFA(ccc), BPFA is BFA(Proper) and BMM is BFA(K)
where K is the class of forcing notions that preserve stationary subsets of ω1.
One of the key questions left open by ZFC and resolved by forcing axioms stronger
than MAℵ1 is the value of the continuum c. Thus, Foreman, Magidor and Shelah
[7] showed that MM implies that c = ℵ2. The same conclusion was obtained from
the weaker proper forcing axiom PFA by the second author [21] and Todorcˇevic´ [4].
In [22] Woodin identiﬁed a statement ψAC which follows from both Woodin’s Pmax-
axiom (∗) and from MM, and implies that c = 2ℵ1 = ℵ2 and that there is a well-
ordering of the reals deﬁnable with parameters in (Hℵ2 ,∈). Moreover, Woodin showed
that BMM together with the existence of a measurable cardinal implies that the
continuum is ℵ2. The assumption of the existence of a measurable cardinal was
later eliminated by Todorcˇevic´ [20] who deduced these consequences of ψAC from
a statement he called θAC that he showed follows from BMM. Recently, Moore [14]
introduced the mapping reﬂection principle MRP and deduced it from PFA. Although
MRP does not follow from BPFA, Moore [14] used similar ideas to show that BPFA
implies a certain statement υAC which in turn implies that there is a well ordering of
the reals, and in fact of P(ω1), of order type ω2 which is Δ2-deﬁnable in the structure
(Hℵ2 ,∈) with parameter a subset of ω1.
This paper continues this line of research. Our results were motivated by an at-
tempt to extend the result of the second author [21] who showed that if MM holds
and M is an inner model such that ωM2 = ω2, then P(ω1) ⊆ M . The interest in
this study comes from the question, initially considered by Laver and Carlson (un-
published), of whether PFA can be preserved by some forcing notion in a nontrivial
way. The best published result in this direction is the result of Ko¨nig and Yoshinobu
[11, Theorem 6.1] who showed that PFA is preserved by ω2-closed forcing. The same
holds for BPFA. In fact, BPFA is preserved by any proper forcing that does not add
subsets of ω1. In this paper we use some of the ideas introduced by Moore [14] and
design a robust coding of reals by triples of ordinals smaller than ω2. This allows us
to show (Theorem 1) that if M is an inner model, BPFA holds in both M and V ,
and ℵM2 = ℵ2, then P(ω1) ⊆ M . This answers the question considered by Laver and
Carlson negatively. Moreover, our coding allows us to show (Theorem 2) that BPFA
implies the existence of a well ordering of the reals of optimal complexity, namely, Δ1
with parameter a subset of ω1. We then use these ideas to build a minimal model of
BPFA and to show that under PFA the set of validities of the logic with the Ha¨rtig
quantiﬁer is not ordinal deﬁnable in L(R). This last application was suggested to us
by Jouko Va¨a¨na¨nen in private communication.
Our notation is mostly standard. If κ is an inﬁnite cardinal, then Hκ is the family of
sets whose transitive closure has cardinality smaller than κ, i.e., Hκ = { x : |tc(x)| <
κ }, where tc(·) denotes transitive closure. We use V P to denote the Boolean-valued
extension of V by the forcing notion P , equivalently, and abusing language, V P
denotes any extension V [G] where G is P-generic over V . A forcing Q is a factor of
P iﬀ V Q ⊆ V P , i.e., iﬀ every P-generic extension of V contains an object Q-generic
over V . In this case, there is a forcing B ∈ V Q such that ro(P) ∼= ro(Q) ∗ B˙, and we
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write B ∼= ro(P)/ro(Q). We may on occasion abuse language and write P instead
of ro(P), etc. Here, ro(P) denotes the regular open algebra of P , i.e., the unique
complete Boolean algebra into which P embeds densely. Suppose V ⊆ M ⊆ V P
where M |= ZFC. Then there is a factor Q of P such that M = V Q ([10, Lemma
15.43]). By a real we mean an element of the Cantor set 2ω. If X is a set and (X,∈)
satisﬁes extensionality, we let π : X → X¯ denote the Mostowski collapse of X , i.e., the
unique isomorphism between X and its transitive collapse. For all other notation, an
introduction to set theory, and forcing see [10] to which we also refer for all concepts
not deﬁned explicitly in this paper.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we reduce Theorem 1 and Theorem
2 to the veriﬁcation of two facts. The proof of these two facts occupies sections 3
and 4. Sections 5 and 6 contain applications of Theorem 1. In section 5 we build a
minimal model of BPFA, solving a question of Sy Friedman. In section 6 we show that
the set VI of validities of the logic with the Ha¨rtig quantiﬁer is not lightface projective
under BPFA and not even ordinal deﬁnable in L(R) under PFA; this last result follows
from a suggestion by Hugh Woodin that allowed us to improve our original result
that PFA implies that VI is not deﬁnable in L(R) without parameters.
The main results, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, were obtained during the Fall of
2004, while the second author was visiting the Erwin Schro¨dinger Institute in Vienna.
The results in section 5 and 6 were obtained during the Spring of 2005 while the
ﬁrst author was visiting the Universite´ Denis-Diderot in Paris. We want to thank
our respective hosts for their hospitality and generosity. We would also like to thank
Jouko Va¨a¨na¨nen for many useful conversations involving the content of this paper
and Hugh Woodin for his suggestions on section 6.
2. Coding reals
The main results of this paper can be seen as consequences of Moore’s mapping
reﬂection principle MRP introduced in [14]. In [14, Theorem 1.1] it is shown that MRP
is a consequence of PFA. Although BPFA is not suﬃcient to imply the full version
of MRP we argue that it does imply the relevant consequences of MRP and thus we
obtain the desired conclusions.
We start by describing a coding of reals by sets of ordinals reminiscent of Moore’s
υAC. We ﬁx a C-sequence C = (Cξ : ξ < ω1 a limit ordinal ), i.e., Cξ is an unbounded
subset of ξ of order type ω for all limit ordinals ξ < ω1. Given x, y, z sets of natural
numbers, deﬁne an equivalence relation ∼x on ω \ x by setting n ∼x m (for n ≤ m)
iﬀ [n,m]∩x = ∅. Thus the equivalence classes of ∼x are simply the intervals between
the consecutive members of x. Let (Ik)k≤t (t ≤ ω) be the natural enumeration of
those equivalence classes which intersect both y and z. In the cases that interest us
t will be ﬁnite, but, in general, t = ω is possible. Let the oscillation of x, y, z be the
function o(x, y, z) : t → 2 deﬁned by letting for all k < t,
o(x, y, z)(k) = 0 iﬀ min(Ik ∩ y) ≤ min(Ik ∩ z).
Let ω1 < β < γ < δ be ﬁxed limit ordinals and suppose N ⊆ M ⊆ δ are countable
sets of ordinals. Assume that {ω1, β, γ} ⊂ N , that sup(ξ ∩ N) < sup(ξ ∩ M) and
sup(ξ ∩M) is a limit ordinal, for every ξ ∈ {ω1, β, γ, δ}. Then the pair (N,M) codes
a ﬁnite binary sequence as follows. Take the transitive collapse M¯ of M and let π
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be the collapsing map. Let αM = π(ω1), βM = π(β), γM = π(γ), δM = M¯ , each of
these is a countable limit ordinal. Let the height of αN = sup(π[ω1 ∩ N ]) in αM be
the integer
n = n(N,M) = card(αN ∩ CαM ).
Deﬁne three sets x, y and z of integers by
x = { card(π(ξ) ∩ CβM ) : ξ ∈ β ∩N }
and similarly for y and z with γ and δ, respectively, instead of β. Notice that x, y, z
are ﬁnite by our assumption on N and M . Now, we look at the oscillation of x \ n,
y \ n and z \ n, which is a binary sequence, and if its length is at least n then we let
sβγδ(N,M) = o(x \ n, y \ n, z \ n)  n.
In all other cases we let sβγδ(N,M) = ∗. We similarly write sβγδ(N,M)  l = ∗ if
l > n(N,M).
Remark 1. Notice that there is a ﬁnite T ⊂ N such that for any S ⊂ N , if
T ⊂ S then sβγδ(S,M) = sβγδ(N,M). In eﬀect, it suﬃces that T contains {ω1, β, γ},
π−1[αN ∩ CαM ], one point of N for each interval in β ∩M determined by π
−1[CβM ]
that N meets, and similarly for γ and δ.
Finally, we say that the triple (β, γ, δ) codes a real r if there is a continuous in-
creasing sequence (Nξ : ξ < ω1) of countable sets whose union is δ such that for every
countable limit ordinal ξ there is ν < ξ such that
r =
⋃
ν<η<ξ
sβγδ(Nη, Nξ).
We are going to show that BPFA implies the following two facts:
(1) Given ordinals ω1 < β < γ < δ < ω2 of coﬁnality ω1 there is an increasing
continuous sequence (Nξ : ξ < ω1) of countable sets whose union is δ such
that for every limit ordinal ξ < ω1 and every integer n there is ν < ξ and
snξ ∈ {0, 1}
n ∪ {∗} such that sβγδ(Nη, Nξ)  n = snξ for every η such that
ν < η < ξ.
(2) For each real r there are ordinals ω1 < β < γ < δ < ω2 of coﬁnality ω1 such
that the triple (β, γ, δ) codes r.
Remark 2. Notice that in (1) we are not claiming that for a ﬁxed n the values of
snξ cohere as ξ varies. However, by the way we have deﬁned our coding it follows that
for a ﬁxed limit ordinal ξ the values of snξ (other than ∗) cohere as n varies.
Before we proceed to the proof that BPFA implies (1) and (2) let us point out some
consequences.
Theorem 1. Assume M is an inner model, BPFA holds in both M and V , and
ωM2 = ω2. Then P(ω1) ⊂ M .
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Proof: We claim that the theorem follows from (1) and (2). To see this, assume
that M is an inner model of V , that BPFA holds in both M and V and ωM1 = ω1.
Fix a C-sequence in M to carry out the codings just described. Suppose ω1 < β <
γ < δ < ωM2 are ordinals of coﬁnality ω1 and the triple (β, γ, δ) codes in V a real r.
Let (Nξ : ξ < ω1) be a continuous increasing sequence of countable sets with union
δ witnessing this. In M there is a sequence (Pξ : ξ < ω1) witnessing (1) for (β, γ, δ).
There is a club C ⊆ ω1 in V such that Nξ = Pξ, for every ξ ∈ C. Then it follows
that for any ξ which is a limit point of C, r =
⋃
n s
n
ξ , as computed in M relative to
the sequence (Pξ : ξ < ω1). It follows that r ∈ M . If, moreover, ω2 = ωM2 , then any
real is coded in V by some triple of ordinals less than ωM2 and thus all reals are in
M . But then P(ω1) ⊆ M , since, given any ω1-sequence in M of almost disjoint reals,
BPFA, and in fact MAℵ1 , allows us to code any subset of ω1 via this sequence and a
real.
Recall that Moore showed in [14] that BPFA, in fact, the coding principle he named
υAC, implies that 2
ℵ0 = 2ℵ1 = ℵ2. Since BPFA implies MAℵ1 , this also follows from
our result.
Theorem 2. BPFA implies that there is a Δ1 well ordering of P(ω1) with parameter
a subset of ω1. The length of the well ordering is ω2.
Proof: Fix as parameter a C-sequence C = (Cξ : ξ < ω1 a limit ordinal). Let T
be the theory “ZFC−Power set+MAℵ1 + (1) + (2) + ∀x (|x| ≤ ℵ1)”. Notice that any
transitive model M of T which contains C is uniquely determined by Ord ∩M . In
eﬀect, notice that since C ∈ M , M computes ω1 correctly. Suppose a real r is coded
by some triple (β, γ, δ) of ordinals in M . Then, arguing as in the proof of Theorem
1, we see that r ∈ M . Notice that we are not claiming that M knows that (β, γ, δ)
codes r, just that r ∈ M . Since M also satisﬁes (2) it follows that the reals in M are
precisely the reals coded by some triple of ordinals which belong to M . Since MAℵ1
holds in M it follows that P(ω1)M is completely determined as well. Namely, from C
we can deﬁne a canonical ω1-sequence r of almost disjoint reals, and we can use the
standard almost disjoint coding to code a subset of ω1 by the sequence r and a real.
Now, for an ordinal θ < ω2, let Mθ be the unique transitive model M of T containing
C such that Ord∩M = θ, if it exists; otherwise let Mθ = ∅. Notice that the function
θ → Mθ is Δ1 in the parameter C.
Now, let <∗ be the antilexicographic ordering on the class [Ord]
3 of increasing
triples of ordinals. For a real r let θr be the least θ such that r ∈ Mθ and let (βr, γr, δr)
be the <∗-least triple of ordinals smaller than θr such that Mθr |= (βr , γr, δr) codes r.
Finally, let r  s iﬀ either θr < θs or θr = θs and (βr, γr, δr) <∗ (βs, γs, δs).
We can now deﬁne a well ordering ≺ of P(ω1) as follows. For a and b subsets of
ω1, we deﬁne a ≺ b iﬀ the -least real coding a from the sequence r of almost disjoint
reals deﬁned from C is -smaller than the -least real coding b. By an argument
similar to the above, ≺ is also Δ1 in the parameter C.
As an additional bonus, notice that the set of possible parameters in the deﬁnition
of the well ordering, i.e., the set of C-sequences, is Δ0 in the parameter ω1.
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Remark 3. The readers familiar with [14] may ﬁnd in order a few words contrasting
our Theorems 1 and 2 with the results in [14], speciﬁcally Moore’s result that BPFA
implies that there is a well-ordering of P(ω1) deﬁnable over (Hℵ2 ,∈,NSω1) from a C-
sequence. In [14] the principle υAC is introduced and shown to follow from BPFA. From
υAC it follows that each equivalence class [S] ∈ P(ω1)/NSω1 is coded by an ordinal
δ < ω2 of coﬁnality ω1, where NSω1 denotes the nonstationary ideal on ω1. This
corresponds to the statement we numbered (2) above. The statement corresponding
to (1), namely that any such δ codes some equivalence class [S], is also a consequence
of BPFA as can be easily seen from the arguments in [14] even though it is not explicitly
mentioned there, alternately one can argue as in section 3 below. However, it seems
that these versions of (1) and (2) do not suﬃce to prove Theorem 1. The standard
way in which P(ω) is coded once we have υAC (or Woodin’s ψAC, or Todorcˇevic´’s θAC)
consists of ﬁxing a partition S = (Sn :n < ω) of ω1 into stationary sets and assigning
to a real r ∈ 2ω the ordinal corresponding to [Sr], where Sr =
⋃
r(n)=1 Sn.
Suppose that M is an inner model of V , that ωM2 = ω2, and that BPFA holds in
both M and V . Suppose that a partition S ∈ M as above is given such that for each
n, Sn is still stationary in V . Such partitions actually exist, as Larson shows in [12].
In V let r be a real and let δ be an ordinal coding r relative to the partition S. In
M , δ codes the equivalence class of some set A. It follows that in V , the symmetric
diﬀerence of A and Sr is nonstationary. However, this is not enough to conclude that
r ∈ M . Namely, for any n such that r(n) = 0, Sn \ A is stationary in M since it is
stationary in V , but, for some n such that r(n) = 1, it may be a priori that Sn \A is
a stationary set in M whose stationarity is destroyed in V . This means that in M ,
we may not be able to recover r from A. And even if r ∈ M , it may be that A \ Sr is
stationary in M but not in V , so we may fail to identify correctly in M the ordinals
that code r in V .
These considerations lead us to look for a coding of reals by triple of ordinals similar
to the one given by υAC but not so explicitly dependent on NSω1 , and this ultimately
resulted in the versions of (1) and (2) mentioned above.
Now consider the complexity of the well-ordering obtained in Theorem 2 and the
one obtained in [14]. Using υAC and ﬁxing a partition S of ω1 into stationary sets, for
each real r let δr be the least ordinal which codes the equivalence class of Sr. We say
r < s iﬀ δr < δs. To say that r < s one needs to express that there is an ordinal δ
which codes Sr (this part is Σ1) and such that for all ordinals μ < δ the set coded by
μ is not equal to Ss modulo NSω1 . The point is that this second part adds another
quantiﬁer, since expressing that the symmetric diﬀerence of the set coded by μ and
Ss is stationary is a Π1 statement.
Remark 4. It is open whether even MM implies that there is a deﬁnable well ordering
of the reals without parameters.
Corollary 1. Assume BPFA holds and ω1 = ω
L
1 . Then there is a projective well-
ordering of the reals.
Proof: The argument is very similar to the one in [5], so we only sketch the main
points. Just notice that in L there is a C-sequence C that is Δ12 in the codes. By
Shoenﬁeld absoluteness, C is still Δ12 in V and, since ω1 = ω
L
1 , it is still a C-sequence.
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From C, we can deﬁne a well-ordering of R by looking at ordinals in Sω2ω1 , but they can
be coded as subsets of ω1, which can be coded by reals using almost disjoint forcing,
for this we can use a Δ12 sequence in L of almost disjoint reals as the ω1-sequence
relative to which the almost disjoint coding takes place. As shown in [5], these codings
are projective.
Remark 5. The well ordering obtained in Corollary 1 is in general not optimal.
Friedman has shown the consistency of BPFA together with a Σ13 well ordering of the
reals by class forcing techniques, see [6].
3. Open partitions
The purpose of this section is to show that BPFA implies (1). We start by recalling
the relevant deﬁnitions from [14].
Deﬁnition 1 ([14, Deﬁnition 2.1]). Let θ be a regular cardinal, let X be uncountable,
and let M ≺ Hθ be countable such that [X ]ω ∈ M . A subset Σ of [X ]ω is M -stationary
iﬀ for all E ∈ M such that E ⊆ [X ]ω is club, Σ ∩ E ∩M = ∅.
Recall that the Ellentuck topology on [X ]ω is obtained by declaring a set open iﬀ
it is the union of sets of the form
[x,N ] = {Y ∈ [X ]ω :x ⊆ Y ⊆ N}
where N ∈ [X ]ω and x ⊆ N is ﬁnite. When we say ‘open’ in this paper we refer to
this topology.
Deﬁnition 2 ([14, Deﬁnition 2.3]). A set mapping Σ is open stationary iﬀ there is
an uncountable set X = XΣ and a regular cardinal θ = θΣ such that [X ]
ω ∈ Hθ,
dom(Σ) is a club in [Hθ]
ω and Σ(M) ⊆ [X ]ω is open and M -stationary, for every M
in the domain of Σ.
Recall the Mapping Reﬂection Principle (MRP) introduced in [14].
If Σ is an open stationary set mapping whose domain is a club, there is a
continuous ∈-chain N = (Nξ : ξ < ω1) of elements in the domain of Σ such
that for all limit ordinals ξ < ω1 there is ν < ξ such that Nη∩XΣ ∈ Σ(Nξ)
for all η such that ν < η < ξ.
If (Nξ : ξ < ω1) satisﬁes the conclusion of MRP for Σ then it is said to be a reﬂecting
sequence for Σ. It is shown in [14] that MRP is a consequence of PFA. In fact, what
is proved in [14] is that for a given open stationary set mapping Σ there is a proper
forcing notion which introduces a reﬂecting sequence for Σ.
Lemma 1. Assume MRP. Suppose that for each α < ω1 we have a partition α =
K0α ∪ K
1
α into clopen sets in the standard order topology on α. Then there a club
C ⊂ ω1 such that for every limit point ξ of C there is i ∈ 2 such that C \ Kiξ is
bounded in ξ. Moreover, this conclusion follows from BPFA.
Proof: Let X = ω1 and let θ be a suﬃciently large regular cardinal. Notice that
ω1 is a closed subset of [ω1]
ω in the Ellentuck topology and the relativization of this
topology to ω1 is just the usual order topology on ω1.
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Let M ≺ Hθ be countable and let α = M ∩ ω1. We claim that one of the Kiα
(i ∈ 2) is M -stationary. Otherwise, there are E0, E1 ∈ M club subsets of ω1 such that
Ei ∩Kiα = ∅ (i ∈ 2) and therefore E0 ∩ E1 = ∅ by elementarity. Deﬁne Σ by letting
Σ(M) = [ω1]
ω \Kiα for the i such that K
1−i
α is M -stationary. Now, applying MRP we
obtain a reﬂecting sequence (Nξ : ξ < ω1) for Σ. Let C = {Nξ ∩ ω1 : ξ < ω1}. It is
clear that C is as required. To see that the conclusion follows from BPFA notice that
the existence of C as stated is a Σ1 statement with parameter (K
i
α :α < ω1, i ∈ 2).
Since any particular instance of MRP can be forced by a proper forcing it follows that
BPFA implies the conclusion of the lemma.
Lemma 2. Assume BPFA. Then (1) holds.
Proof: Fix a triple of ordinals ω1 < β < γ < δ < ω2, each of coﬁnality ω1. We ﬁrst
ﬁnd an increasing continuous sequence (Nξ : ξ < ω1) of countable sets with union δ.
By thinning out the sequence, if necessary, we may assume that {ω1, β, γ} ⊆ N0, that
sup(ρ ∩ Nξ) is a limit ordinal and sup(ρ ∩ Nη) < sup(ρ ∩Nξ), for every η < ξ < ω1
and ρ ∈ {ω1, β, γ, δ}. Fix an integer n and deﬁne, for each countable limit ordinal ξ,
a partition of ξ into 2n + 1 disjoint sets, ξ =
⋃
s∈2n∪{∗}K
s
ξ by
η ∈ Ksξ iﬀ sβγδ(Nη, Nξ)  n = s.
By Remark 1 each piece of the partition is open in the order topology on ω1 and since
the pieces are disjoint and cover ξ they are also closed. By applying Lemma 1 we
ﬁnd a closed unbounded subset Cn of ω1 and for each limit point ξ of Cn, an element
snξ of 2
n ∪ {∗} such that there is ν < ξ such that sβγδ(Nη, Nξ)  n = snξ for every
η ∈ Cn such that ν < η < ξ. Finally, let C =
⋂
n Cn. Then the sequence (Nξ : ξ ∈ C)
witnesses (1) for the triple (β, γ, δ).
4. Playing games
Now we show that BPFA implies (2). As before we ﬁrst show that MRP implies
(2) and then argue that BPFA suﬃces. In order to show that the appropriate set
mapping is open stationary we shall use a game argument reminiscent of [21, Lemma
3.7]. For a given algebra F : [ω4]
<ω → ω4, we deﬁne a sequence of games GFν indexed
by countable ordinals ν. These are ω-length perfect information games between two
players I and II playing alternately. We show that these games are determined and
that player II has a winning strategy for almost all of them. Playing against these
strategies allows us to build models where any desired oscillation pattern occurs. This
implies that for every real r a certain map Σr to be deﬁned below is open stationary,
from which (2) follows immediately in the presence of MRP. We then argue as in
Lemma 1 to show that BPFA is suﬃcient to imply (2). The game GFν is deﬁned as
follows:
I β0 γ0 δ0 β1 γ1
II κ0, ε0 λ0, ϑ0 μ0, 0 κ1, ε1 . . .
As indicated in the diagram, player I plays, alternately, ordinals βi, γi or δi such
that (βi)i, (γi)i and (δi)i are increasing sequences of ordinals in ω2, ω3 and ω4 respec-
tively.
Player II responds in turn by playing, alternately,
• ordinals κi, εi such that βi ≤ κi ≤ εi < ℵ2.
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• ordinals λi, ϑi such that γi ≤ λi ≤ ϑi < ℵ3.
• ordinals μi, i such that δi ≤ μi ≤ i < ℵ4.
We also require, although this is not really essential, that
• εi < βi+1, ϑi < γi+1 and i < δi+1, for all i < ω.
The ﬁrst player to violate these rules loses. Otherwise, let
X = clF ({ κn, λn, μn :n < ω} ∪ ν),
where clF denotes closure under F . Then we say that player II wins iﬀ
• X ∩ ω1 = ν,
• X ∩ [βn, βn+1) ⊆ [βn, εn) for all n,
• X ∩ [γn, γn+1) ⊆ [γn, ϑn) for all n, and
• X ∩ [δn, δn+1) ⊆ [δn, n) for all n.
It follows that if player I wins a particular run of GFν then this happens at some ﬁnite
stage. By the Gale-Stewart theorem GFν is determined, for all ν. We now show that
player II wins GFν for club many ν. Let
AF = { ν < ω1 : I has a winning strategy in G
F
ν }.
Lemma 3. AF is nonstationary.
Proof: This is similar to [21, Lemma 3.7]. Assume towards contradiction that AF
is stationary and ﬁx, for each ν ∈ AF , a winning strategy σν for I in GFν . Since AF
has cardinality ℵ1 there is a strategy σ which dominates all the σν . Namely, at any
given position when it is player I’s turn, σ looks at what the strategies σν would play,
for ν ∈ AF , and plays the supremum of these ordinals. Then clearly σ is a winning
strategy for I in GFν for all ν ∈ AF . Moreover, we can assume that at every stage
when it is player I’s turn to play an ordinal γn < ω3 the move played by σ does not
depend on the previous move of player II. This is possible since there are only ℵ2
possible previous moves of player II, so we look at what σ would play against each
of them and play the supremum of these ordinals. Similarly, we may assume that at
every stage when it is player I’s turn to play an ordinal δn < ω4, the move played by
σ does not depend on the two previous moves of player II. We call this property of σ
stability.
We now describe a play of II against σ. Fix a suﬃciently large regular cardinal θ
and build an increasing continuous chain
P0 ≺ P1 ≺ · · · ≺ Pξ ≺ · · · ≺ Hθ, ξ < ω1 · ω
of elementary submodels of Hθ of size ℵ1 such that F,AF , σ ∈ P0. Let Nn = Pω1·n and
N =
⋃
n Nn. Notice that, for all n, the ordinals ζn = sup(Nn∩ω2), ηn = sup(Nn∩ω3)
and θn = sup(Nn ∩ ω4) all have coﬁnality ω1 and Nn contains as subsets ω1-club
subsets of each of these ordinals that belong as elements to Nn+1. Since we assumed
that AF is stationary we can ﬁnd a countable M ≺ N such that {ζn, ηn, θn}n ⊆ M ,
F, σ,AF ∈ M , all the club sets mentioned above belong to M , and α = M ∩ω1 ∈ AF .
We describe a run of GFα in which player I plays following σ. We consider the game
as consisting of rounds of three moves of each player, one in each of ω2, ω3 and ω4.
Suppose that we are at the start of the n-th round, the current position is pn−1 =
〈β0, (κ0, ε0), . . . , δn−1, (μn−1, n−1)〉, and we have arranged that pn−1 ∈ Nn. Player
I then plays βn = σ(pn−1). Since σ, pn−1 ∈ Nn it follows that βn ∈ Nn. Player
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II picks an ordinal κn ∈ M ∩ Nn+1 such that ζn ≤ κn < ω2. Let εn = sup(M ∩
Nn+1 ∩ ω2). Since M is countable and ζn+1 = sup(Nn+1 ∩ ω2) has coﬁnality ω1 it
follows that εn < ζn+1. In fact, since Nn+1 contains a club in ζn+1 that belongs
to M , it follows that εn ∈ Nn+1. Player II then plays (κn, εn). Player I responds
by playing σ(pn−1̂〈βn, (κn, εn)〉) = γn. By elementarity of Nn and stability of σ
it follows that γn ∈ Nn. Player II then picks some λn ∈ M ∩ Nn+1 such that
ηn ≤ λn < ω3. Let ϑn = sup(M ∩ Nn+1 ∩ ω3). By the same argument as above,
ϑn < ηn+1 and ϑn ∈ Nn+1. Player II then plays (λn, ϑn). Player I responds by
playing δn = σ(pn−1̂〈βn, (κn, εn), γn, (λn, ϑn)〉). Again, by elementarity of Nn and
stability of σ it follows that δn ∈ Nn. Player II picks some ordinal μn ∈ M ∩
Nn+1 such that θn ≤ μn < ω4. Let n = sup(M ∩ Nn+1 ∩ ω4). Again, we have
that n < θn+1 and, in fact, n ∈ Nn+1. Player II then plays (μn, n). Let
pn = pn−1̂ 〈βn, (κn, εn), γn, (λn, ϑn), δn, (μn, n)〉. It follows that pn ∈ Nn+1. This
completes the inductive construction of the play. Let
X = clF ({ κi, λi, μi : i < ω} ∪ α).
Notice that X ⊆ M . This implies that X ∩ ω1 = α. Also since βn+1 ∈ Nn+1 and
εn = sup(M ∩Nn+1∩ω2) it follows that X∩ [βn, βn+1) ⊆ [βn, εn), for all n. Similarly,
we have that X ∩ [γn, γn+1) ⊆ [γn, ϑn), and X ∩ [δn, δn+1) ⊆ [δn, n), for all n. Thus,
player II has won this run of GFα , a contradiction.
Lemma 4. Assume BPFA. Then for every real r there is a triple of ordinals less
than ω2 coding r, i.e., (2) holds.
Proof: Fix a real r. As before we will ﬁrst derive the desired conclusion from
MRP and then argue that it also follows from BPFA. We start by deﬁning an open
stationary set mapping Σr. Fix a suﬃciently large regular cardinal θ. For a countable
elementary submodel M of Hθ deﬁne
Σr(M) = {N ∈ [M ∩ ω4]
ω
: sω2ω3ω4(N,M ∩ ω4) is an initial segment of r }.
By Remark 1, Σr(M) is open in the Ellentuck topology on [ω4]
ω. We will show that
it is also M -stationary. Assume this for a moment and let us see how to ﬁnish the
proof.
Assume ﬁrst MRP and let (Mξ : ξ < ω1) be a reﬂecting sequence for Σ
r. Let
M =
⋃
ξ<ω1
Mξ, let M¯ be the transitive collapse of M and let π be the collapsing
map. Let β = π(ω2), γ = π(ω3) and δ = π(ω4). Then ω1 < β < γ < δ < ω2 and
cof(β) = cof(γ) = cof(δ) = ω1. Let Nξ = π(Mξ ∩ ω4). Note that sβγδ(Nη, Nξ) =
sω2ω3ω4(Mη ∩ ω4,Mξ ∩ ω4) for every η < ξ < ω1. Moreover, for ξ a limit ordinal,
Nξ =
⋃
η<ξ Nη and therefore limη<ξ n(Nη, Nξ) = ω. It follows that for some ν < ξ,
r =
⋃
ν<η<ξ
sβγδ(Nη, Nξ).
Therefore the triple (β, γ, δ) codes r as desired. To see that the same conclusion
follows from BPFA note that there is a proper forcing notion adding a reﬂecting
sequence for Σr and the existence of a triple coding r is a Σ1 statement in parameter
the C-sequence used for the coding and the real r. Therefore the existence of such a
triple of ordinals follows from BPFA. To complete the proof of Lemma 4 it remains
to show the following.
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Lemma 5. Σr is a stationary set mapping.
Proof: Let M be a countable elementary submodel of Hθ. We have to show that
Σr(M) is M -stationary. We work in M and ﬁx an algebra F on ω4. By Lemma 3 we
can ﬁnd a club C in ω1 and for every ν ∈ C a winning strategy σν for player II in GFν .
We show that we can ﬁx an ordinal ν ∈ C ∩M and play ﬁnitely many moves of the
game GFν with ordinals inside M such that if T is the ﬁnite set of relevant ordinals
played by player II and X = clF (T ∪ ν) then sω2ω3ω4(X,M ∩ω4) is an initial segment
of r. We will never leave M , even though we refer to objects which do not belong to
M to assist us with our choices.
Let M¯ be the transitive collapse of M and let π be the collapsing map. Let αM =
π(ω1), βM = π(ω2), γM = π(ω3) δM = π(ω4). Recall that we have ﬁxed a C-sequence
(Cξ : ξ < ω1). If ρ ∈ M ∩ ω4, the height of ρ in ωi, htωi(ρ), is card(π(ρ) ∩Cπ(ωi)), for
i = 1, . . . , 4. Of course, the height of ρ in ωi is known only outside of M , however we
only need to refer to the heights of ﬁnitely many ordinals.
Now, look at what the strategies σν do at the ﬁrst step when player I plays 0.
For each ν ∈ C, σν(〈0〉) = (κν0 , ε
ν
0) is a pair of ordinals below ω2 with κ
ν
0 ≤ ε
ν
0 . Let
ε0 ∈ ω2∩M be the supremum of all the εν0 . Similarly, let (λ
ν
0 , ϑ
ν
0) = σν(〈0, σν(〈0〉), 0〉),
and let ϑ0 ∈ M ∩ω3 be the supremum of all the ϑν0 . Deﬁne 0 analogously. Stepping
out of M for a moment, look at the height of ε0 in ω2 and similarly with ϑ0 and 0.
Let k be the largest of these integers. We now choose ν ∈ C ∩M be such that its
height in ω1, say n, is bigger than k. We are going to play the game GFν and player
II is going to use his winning strategy σν .
The ﬁrst round of the play, consisting of three moves for each player, is a bit
special. In it, player I simply plays 0 three times and player II responds according to
σν . Let us say that the three moves of player II in this round are (κ0, ε0), (λ0, ϑ0)
and (μ0, 0). By the choice of ν we have that the height of ε0 in ω2, the height of ϑ0
in ω3 and the height of 0 in ω4 are all smaller than n.
Suppose we have played rounds 0, . . . , i− 1 and the moves of player II in the last
round are (κi−1, εi−1), (λi−1, ϑi−1) and (μi−1, i−1). In the next round we have to
code r(i− 1). Player I ﬁrst chooses βi such that
htω2(βi) > max{htω3(ϑi−1), htω4(i−1), n}.
Player II responds using σν and plays, say, (κi, εi). We have βi ≤ κi ≤ εi. Then there
are two cases.
Case 1. r(i−1) = 0. Player I then chooses γi such that htω3(γi) > htω2(εi). Player II
follows σν and plays, say, (λi, ϑi). Of course, we have that γi ≤ λi ≤ ϑi. Player I then
plays δi such that htω4(δi) > htω3(ϑi) and player II, using σν , plays, say, (μi, i). Of
course, we have δi ≤ μi ≤ i. Therefore, the height in ω2 of any point of the interval
[βi, εi) is smaller than the height in ω3 of any point of the interval [γi, ϑi) which in
turn is smaller than the height in ω4 of any point of the interval [δi, i).
Case 2. r(i−1) = 1. First ﬁx an ordinal ξ ∈ ω4∩M such that htω4(ξ) > htω2(εi). For
each move, say, γ < ω3 of player I, suppose the strategy σν responds by (λ(γ), ϑ(γ)).
Now, suppose that if player I then plays ξ the strategy σν responds by (μ(γ), (γ)).
Let  = sup{(γ) : γ < ω3}. Player I then plays some γi ∈ ω3 ∩ M such that
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htω3(γi) > htω4(). Player II then responds according to σν and player I then plays
ξ and player II responds by using σν and plays, say, (μi, i). In this way we ensure
that htω3(γi) > htω4(i). Therefore, the height in ω2 of any point of the interval
[βi, εi) is smaller than the height in ω4 of any point of the interval [δi, i) which is
smaller than the height in ω3 of any point of the interval [γi, ϑi).
We play this game for n + 1 rounds and code in this way the ﬁrst n digits of r.
Finally, let X = clF ({κi, λi, μi : i ≤ n + 1} ∪ ν). Since σν is a winning strategy for
player II in GFα , by our construction it follows that sω2ω3ω4(X,M ∩ω4) = r  n. Thus,
X ∈ Σr(M). Since F is an arbitrary algebra on ω4 and X is closed under F it follows
that Σr(M) is M -stationary. This completes the proof of Lemma 5 and Lemma 4.
5. A minimal model of BPFA
Let φ be a sentence in the language of set theory. Let us say that a model M of
ZFC + φ is minimal for φ iﬀ for any inner model N ⊆ M with the same ordinals, if
N is also a model of ZFC + φ then N = M .
Recall ([8]) that an uncountable regular cardinal κ is Σ1-reﬂecting (or Hκ-reﬂecting)
iﬀ for every a ∈ Hκ and every formula ϕ(x), if there is a regular cardinal θ such that
Hθ |= ϕ(a) then there is a θ
′ < κ such that a ∈ Hθ′ and Hθ′ |= ϕ(a).
In [8, Theorem 2.11], Goldstern and Shelah show that if κ is Σ1-reﬂecting, then
there is a countable support iteration of length κ of proper forcing notions of size
smaller than κ that forces BPFA. For future reference, we sketch the construction.
We deﬁne a countable support iteration of proper forcing notions of size less than κ,
〈Pα; Q˙α :α < κ〉, and let Pκ be their direct limit. At stage α we have some Σ1 formula
and a parameter which is a subset of ω1, and ask if there is a proper poset which adds
a solution to this formula. If the answer is yes then, since κ is Σ1-reﬂecting, there
is such a poset of size less than κ and we choose one as Qα. We do this using some
standard bookkeeping device so every subset of ω1 appearing along the iteration and
every Σ1 formula are considered at coﬁnally many stages. We will refer to this Pκ as
the standard iteration for BPFA. Conversely, by [8, Theorem 4.1], if BPFA holds then
ℵ2 is Σ1-reﬂecting in L.
Let κ be the smallest Σ1-reﬂecting cardinal in L and let G be generic for the
standard iteration Pκ for BPFA. We argue in this section that there is an inner
model M of L[G] which is a minimal model for BPFA. This answers a question of Sy
Friedman (private communication).
Theorem 3. Suppose that κ is a Σ1-reﬂecting cardinal in V and that Pκ is the stan-
dard iteration for BPFA. Let M = V (P(ω1)V
Pκ
). Then M |= BPFA.
Proof: Recall that if N is an inner model of the universe V and X is a set, then
N(X) =
⋃
α L(Nα ∪ tc({X})), where Nα = N ∩ Vα and the union is over all the
ordinals. This is a model of ZF. In particular, M is a model of ZF. It is in fact a
model of Choice, by the argument of Theorem 2. Let Q be the complete subalgebra
of ro(Pκ) such that V Q = M . Then Q is proper. Let a ⊆ ω1 (so a ∈ M) and let
ϕ be a Σ1 formula, say ϕ is ∃xψ(x, a), where ψ is Σ0. Since Pκ is κ-cc, there is an
α < κ such that a ∈ V Pα and a has size ℵ1 there. The formula ϕ and the parameter
a are considered at some stage β > α of the iteration. Notice that V Pβ ⊆ V Q. Since
BPFA AND WELL ORDERINGS OF THE REALS 405
the tail of the iteration Pκ/Pβ is proper in V Pβ and Q/Pβ is a factor of it, Q/Pβ is
proper in V Pβ , as well. It follows that if there is a proper forcing R ∈ M adding to
M a witness to ϕ(a) then, since Q/Pβ ∗ R˙ is proper, at stage β there was a proper
forcing adding a witness to ϕ(a). Therefore, Qβ was chosen to add such a witness. It
follows that M satisﬁes BPFA.
Corollary 2. In L, let κ be the smallest Σ1-reﬂecting cardinal and let Pκ be the
standard iteration for BPFA of length κ. Let M = L(P(ω1))L
Pκ
. Then M is a
minimal model of BPFA.
Proof: By Theorem 3, M is a model of ZFC + BPFA. Assume that N is an inner
model of M and that N |= BPFA. By minimality of κ, ωN2 = κ = ω
M
2 , so Theorem 1
applies, and P(ω1)M ⊂ N , so N = M .
Remark 6. Let κ be Σ1-reﬂecting over V and suppose that Pκ is given by the
standard iteration for BPFA. Let G be Pκ-generic over V . It would be interesting to
know whether V (P(ω1)V [G]) is actually diﬀerent from V [G]. Notice that the forcing
extending V (P(ω1)V [G]) to V [G] is ω-distributive and ω2-cc. If the ground model
is L, it is even ω1-distributive. The problem is that, even though the initial parts
Gα = G ∩ Pα of the generic G belong to V (P(ω1)), they may not be the only Pα-
generic ﬁlters in V (P(ω1)). The question is whether we can glue them together to
get the whole generic G, i.e., we have to choose generic ﬁlters for initial segments of
the iteration which cohere.
Working over L, or any other deﬁnable generically invariant class with deﬁnable
well-orderings, like, for example, the Dodd-Jensen core model KDJ , one can modify
slightly the forcing Pκ so that it has in addition a certain amount of rigidity: if in
V there are two diﬀerent Pκ-generic ﬁlters over L then ωL1 is collapsed. We use the
following fact that we proved in section 4. Given a C-sequence and any real r, there
is a proper forcing Pr of size ℵ
ℵ0
4 collapsing ℵ4 to ℵ1 such that in V
Pr the triple
(ωV2 , ω
V
3 , ω
V
4 ) codes r.
Let κ be a reﬂecting cardinal. We deﬁne 〈Pα; Q˙α :α < κ〉 and let Pκ be their
countable support limit. At odd stages α we proceed as before, i.e., we choose the
forcing Qα of least Pα-name in the sense of the natural well ordering of L. If α is
even, Qα does the following. Let λ be |Pα|L, so λ < κ. We ﬁrst collapse λ to ω1 with
countable conditions. Now, the whole generic up to this point, including the collapse,
can be coded by a subset aα of ω1, and then using almost disjoint coding relative
to a ﬁxed deﬁnable sequence of almost disjoint reals in L, we code aα by a real, say
r = rα. We know the values of ℵ2, ℵ3 and ℵ4 of this model, since they are just the
L-successors of λ (actually we know all the cardinals, but we only need these ones).
For simplicity let us call them β < γ < δ. We then force with Pr. It is easy to see
that Pκ thus obtained forces BPFA.
Notice that at any even stage α, the real coded by (β, γ, δ) cannot change in any
outer model with the same ω1, as being a club in ω1 is upwards absolute between
models with the same ω1, and this real is seen to be r in the extension by Pκ. In
fact, this coding will be done anyway at some triple (not necessarily (β, γ, δ)) when
we force BPFA in the usual way, but the point is that we code the whole generic up to
stage α by these three ordinals which moreover we can identify in the ground model.
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Now, in the end, the generic G will actually be deﬁnable without parameters, as it can
be reconstructed inductively from its initial segments, which can be recovered using
the reals rα. Moreover, G will be unique in any outer model which has the same ω1
as L. It follows that V = L(P(ω1)) holds in L[G].
The canonicity in the choice of Qα for odd stages α and a careful choice of book-
keeping gives us that if λ < κ is a smaller reﬂecting cardinal in L, then the λth stage
of the iteration Pλ also forces BPFA over L. In particular, L[G] will not be a minimal
model for BPFA unless κ is the L-least reﬂecting cardinal. This leads naturally to
the question of whether if M is a minimal model for BPFA, then κ = ωM2 is the least
reﬂecting cardinal in L. The argument above does not answer this question, as there
may be of course a poset Q ∈ L forcing BPFA or even BPFA + V = L(P(ω1)) but
such that no Pκ as above is a factor of Q.
6. The complexity of the logic with the Ha¨rtig quantiﬁer
In this section we present as an application of the main result, an observation
suggested by Jouko Va¨a¨na¨nen on the complexity of the set of validities of the Ha¨rtig
quantiﬁer.
Deﬁnition 3. The logic L(I) is obtained by augmenting ﬁrst-order logic with a binary
quantiﬁer I—the Ha¨rtig quantiﬁer. Formulas in L(I) are deﬁned recursively as in
ﬁrst-order logic, with the additional clause:
If ϕ(x, z) and ψ(y, z) are formulas in L(I), then so is
Ixy (φ(x, z), ψ(y, z)),
where x and y are considered bound variables.
The semantics of L(I) is deﬁned recursively as in ﬁrst-order logic, with the additional
clause:
M = (M, . . . ) |= Ixy (φ(x,a), ψ(y,a)) iﬀ
|{ b ∈ M :M |= φ(b,a) }| = |{ c ∈ M :M |= ψ(c,a) }|.
In a straightforward fashion, we can assign Go¨del numbers to the formulas in L(I).
Let VI be the set of validities of the logic L(I), i.e., the set of (Go¨del numbers for)
sentences in L(I) valid in all models. We refer the reader to [9] for an introduction
to the Ha¨rtig quantiﬁer and for the results we mention in the argument below. This
proof is closely modeled on the argument given in [9] that VI is neither Σ
1
2 nor Π
1
2.
Corollary 3. Suppose that BPFA holds. Then VI is not lightface projective.
Proof: We show that in fact VI is not ﬁrst-order deﬁnable (without parameters)
over N = LℵV
2
(P(ω1)) so, in particular, it is not lightface projective.
Let n be a suﬃciently large integer and denote by ZFCn the ﬁnitely axiomatizable
theory that results from restricting the replacement schema of ZFC to Σn-formulas.
The integer n is chosen so Theorem 1 is provable in ZFCn and also the argument
below goes through.
Let ϕ be a ﬁrst order sentence without parameters in the language of set theory.
We ﬁnd an L(I)-formula ψϕ such that N |= ϕ iﬀ ψϕ ∈ VI . Since ϕ is arbitrary, it
follows that VI cannot be ﬁrst order deﬁnable over N .
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Our sentence ψϕ has the form φ → θϕ, where θϕ is a ﬁrst order sentence (in
the language of set theory) expressing the statement N |= ϕ. φ will be such that
its models are precisely the well-founded models of ZFCn + BPFA whose transitive
collapse correctly computes ℵ2. Suppose M is such a model. Then, by Theorem 1, it
correctly computes N , and the equivalence follows.
All that remains is to exhibit φ. In [9] it is explained how to produce, for any
ﬁnite extension T of a suﬃciently strong fragment of ZFC, an L(I)-sentence φT such
that a structure (M,E) is a well-founded model of T iﬀ it admits an expansion to
a model of φT . Let φN(x), φω1(x) and φω2(x) be the ﬁrst order formulas stating,
respectively, that x is a natural number, that x is a countable ordinal, and that x is an
ordinal below ω2. Our φ is the conjunction of φZFCn+BPFA and ¬Ixy(φN(x), φω1(y))∧
¬Ixy(φω1(x), φω2 (y)), and it is easy to see that φ is as wanted. This completes the
proof. Notice that the map ϕ → ψϕ is recursive.
Remark 7. It is easy to see by condensation and a similar argument, that V = L
implies that VI is not Σ
m
n for any n and any m < ω (or even Σ
α
n for any n and any
α < ωCK1 ). This has also been observed by Va¨a¨na¨nen (private communication).
The following argument incorporates a suggestion of Woodin that strengthens and
simpliﬁes our original argument. Assume PFA holds. By the covering lemma and
the fact that PFA implies ¬κ for all κ ≥ ω1, (see [19]), it follows that X exists
for all sets X . In particular, R exists. By Theorem 1, if N is an inner model of
BPFA (N may be a set) that correctly computes ω2, then Hℵ2 ⊆ N . If N is also a
model of PFA then there is an X ∈ N such that N |= X = R, but then X really
is R (see [16] for the deﬁnition and basic properties of R, from which this follows).
Since R codes the theory of L(R), this easily implies as above that the theory of
L(R) without parameters is recursive in VI and therefore VI is not deﬁnable in L(R)
without parameters.
But something stronger in fact holds. By Steel [18], PFA implies that ADL(R) holds.
Solovay [16] has shown that ADL(R) and the existence of R imply that there is a real
which is ordinal deﬁnable in L(R) but not ordinal deﬁnable in L(R). Since the least
such real in the natural well-ordering of HODL(R
) is obviously recursive in VI by the
arguments above, it follows that VI itself cannot be ordinal deﬁnable in L(R).
Corollary 4. Assume PFA. Then VI is not ordinal deﬁnable in L(R).
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